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Abstract. Data Protection by Design (DPbD, also known as Privacy
by Design) has received much attention in recent years as a method for
building data protection into IT systems from the start. In the EU, DPbD
will become mandatory from 2018 onwards under the GDPR. In earlier
work, we emphasized the multidisciplinary nature of DPbD. The present
paper builds on this to argue that DPbD also needs a multicriteria ap-
proach that goes beyond the traditional focus on (data) privacy (even if
understood in its multiple meanings).
The paper is based on the results of a survey (n=101) among employ-
ees of a large institution concerning the introduction of technology that
tracks some of their behaviour. Even though a substantial portion of
respondents are security/privacy researchers, concerns revolved strongly
around social consequences of the technology change, usability issues,
and transparency. The results taken together indicate that the decrease
in privacy through data collection was associated with (a) an increase in
accountability, (b) the blocking of non-authorized uses of resources, (c)
a decrease in usability, (d) an altered perception of a communal space,
(e) altered actions in the communal space, and (f) an increased salience
of how decisions are made and communicated. These results call into
question the models from computer science / data mining that posit a
privacy-utility tradeoff. Instead, this paper argues, multicriteria notions
of utility are needed, and this leads to design spaces in which less pri-
vacy may be associated with less utility rather than be compensated
for by more utility, as the standard tradeoff models suggest. The paper
concludes with an outlook on activities aimed at raising awareness and
bringing the wider notion of DPbD into decision processes.
Keywords: Implementation aspects of “by design” and “by default”
paradigms; Aspects of privacy impact and risk assessment; user studies;
privacy and utility modelling and decision making
1 Introduction
Data Protection by Design (DPbD) has received much attention in recent years
as an approach for building data protection into IT systems from the start. In
the EU, DPbD will become mandatory from 2018 onwards under the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In a panel at APF 2015, summarized and
elaborated on in [21], we emphasized the need for multidisciplinary approaches
to DPbD and illustrated this with conceptual and empirical examples.
A significant part of DPbD is the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA)
in which, among other things, the likely impacts of the planned technology on
stakeholders’ privacy are assessed. In multidisciplinary DPbD/DPIA, this notion
of privacy (impacts) will be interpreted not only from a computational stand-
point (where well-defined notions of data security and data confidentiality will
be central), but based on a wider understanding of privacy including legal, soci-
ological and psychological aspects. And in line with the GDPR requirement to
implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to effect data pro-
tection, design solutions must be based on state-of-the-art methods for reducing
unnecessary disclosures of personal data and/or avoiding unnecessary inference
channels towards personal information.
The present paper reports on a survey that started from a multidisciplinary
notion of privacy, but discovered in the answers a much richer set of concerns.
This shows that DPbD also needs a multicriteria approach that goes beyond
the traditional focus on data protection and privacy (even if understood in its
multiple meanings).
In this context, it should be noted that the terms “data protection” and
“privacy” are not defined uniformly and often used synonymously. Therefore,
DPbD and DPIA are also often referred to as “Privacy by Design” and “Privacy
Impact Assessment”, e.g. [6, 5, 21]. In the survey described here, both terms were
avoided. In the discussion, I will use the terms “data protection” in the sense of
EU law and “privacy” in the general sense that “privacy can be violated by data
processing”, i.e. the (vague, but commonly used) concept at the intersection of
the EU fundamental rights to privacy and to data protection. I return to a more
differentiated notion of the two terms in the Conclusion.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the case study and
discusses its results. Section 3 investigates the implications, in particular of the
exploratory analysis for risk-utility or privacy-utility tradeoffs in DPbD. Section
4 discusses limitations, and Section 5 summarises the conclusions, and gives
an outlook on future work. Related work is referenced throughout the text to
enhance readability.
2 A case study: Tracking coffee consumption
2.1 Context
Organisational and technological context The technology introduction
took place in a computer-science department of a large research organization
that is offering free coffee, tea and mineral water to staff in a room open to all
on the top floor of their building. For a number of years, two industrial coffee
machines have been serving hot drinks. They are operated and filled with raw
materials by an external service provider. (Hot water could be obtained from
these machines or a separate, household-size electric kettle, with tea bags avail-
able on the table. Most tea drinkers use the electric kettle.) A paper sign on the
door to the staff cafeteria, and paper signs on the coffee machines, communicate
that room and drinks are for staff and their guests only. Doors are open during
business hours and accessible via personnel-card readers at other times.
In November 2016, personnel-card readers were installed on the two coffee
machines. The measure was announced in an email from the Head of Unit and
explained further in a second email, in answer to a question by a staff member.
The emails stated that the only change would be the need to swipe the card
before getting coffee, and that “[t]here are no plans to collect statistics on every-
body’s consumption, neither the type of consumption nor the frequency“. The
costs of coffee per year were mentioned, and the benefits of the department only
having to pay for its members’ coffee consumption.
The personnel cards are contactless cards that are identified by a card num-
ber, which in turn is linked to the personnel ID. A card swipe causes an authen-
tication request to the central authentication server. Upon successful authentica-
tion (= the cardholder is authorized to operate the resource), an electric circuit
is closed for a few seconds and thus allows the resource to function (= the door
to unblock, the coffee machine to dispense a hot drink, ...). All authentication
requests are logged with card ID, resource ID, and timestamp.
The authentication server manages and logs data concerning the close to
70,000 members of the whole organisation. The department investigated in the
present study employs 239 people, all of whom are authorised to consume coffee
from the machines studied.
The cards grant access to a number of resources (originally doors and other
gates) and have to be presented to a card reader to get food in the staff canteens.
The recent deployment on coffee machines is in line with plans for employing the
cards to control access to a wide range of other services (more doors, cupboards
containing expensive equipment, ...). The organisation favours the deployment,
for new purposes, of this form of access control because it is cheap (every member
already has a card, the readers are cheap, and the authentication technology is
in place anyway).
DPbD considerations The collected data are personal data, since they encode
that a person identifiable via their card ID to their personnel ID, operated a cer-
tain resource at a certain time. (The card ID acts as a pseudonym.) The logged
data encode the location and the fact of usage, i.e. that a drink was taken. Are
they also sensitive data, i.e. special categories of data as per EU Data Protection
Directive and GDPR? Food and drink choices are generally considered not to be
sensitive data, although they may allow for inferences towards sensitive data, as
the example of food preferences on airline flights shows1 [13]. Other inferences
are possible, for example from food/drink consumption to health status. In the
current example, the evidence for this is weaker, first because “coffee consump-
tion” and even “coffee addiction” are generally not considered true health risks.
Also, the card reader authentication does not lead to the logging of what drink
the identifiable user chose (although some respondents believe that, see below);
it could have been hot water or chocolate. Another possible type of inference is
that the fact of using the coffee machine signals that the employee takes a break,
but these inferences too are uncertain, since drinks are often taken specifically
to accompany periods of intensive work, meetings, etc.
Motion profiles appear to be the most problematic type of inferences. With
the planned increases in roll-out of card-reader authentication, these profiles can
become increasingly fine-grained.
The introduction of such technology constitutes a potential application case
for DPbD, since such data collection and processing falls under data protection
law. The Article 29 Working Party observed [1, p.4, original emphasis] “Data
protection requirements apply to the monitoring and surveillance of workers
whether in terms of email use, Internet access, video cameras or location data.
Any monitoring must be a proportionate response by an employer to the risks it
faces taking into account the legitimate privacy and other interests of workers.
Any personal data held or used in the course of monitoring must be adequate,
relevant and not excessive for the purpose for which the monitoring is justified.
Any monitoring must be carried out in the least intrusive way possible.” The
possibility of relying on the employer’s “legitimate interest” is emphasized in [7],
and a more general regulatory analysis is given in [15].
A good case study. Additional factors made this a good case study: “Coffee
tracking”, while a clear case of tracking, is perceived as neutral or even amusing
by a majority of employees (as opposed to, say, a tracking of physician visits
would be), and there is in general a high level of trust in the organisation and
its data-protection integrity. This opened up a space in which people felt free to
voice their concerns.
2.2 Research questions
Staff members reacted in different ways to the introduction of the new technol-
ogy, ranging from simply accepting the measure and bringing and swiping their
cards to get coffee, via short discussions of possible reasons, to extended “hacker-
humour” discussions of how to break the system. On the whole, it appeared that
questions and dissatisfaction persisted even after a number of weeks, and this
situation motivated the research.
The research was, in part, motivated by our work on Privacy/Data protection
by design [21]. In addition, the question was what this change in technology and
1 For example, halal/kosher food preference can be an indicator of religion.
user interface of the coffee machines meant for privacy-related decision making
in human-computer interaction.
Specifically, questions revolved around (1) the prerequisites for people to use
PETs, in particular knowledge, beliefs and attitudes, in addition to or even be-
fore usability can improve technology acceptance, as posited in the step model of
[18], and (2) the importance of social influences (as opposed to purely individual
criteria such as cost-benefit analysis) on whether and how to use PETs, as posited
by the ASPECT/ARCADE model of [17]. I was also interested in whether the
knowledge about social effects can be leveraged for PETs technically via notions
such as co-utility [10] and techniques such as collaborative distributed anonymi-
sation [20], but decided to not foreground this complex construct.
The research questions were as follows:
– (RQ1) To what extent is the intent to use PETs dependent on prior knowl-
edge of the underlying data collection technology?
– (RQ2) What are privacy-related decisions based on? In particular, to what
extent is decision-making individual, and to what extent subject to social
influences?
– (RQ3) Co-design: The new access control method constituted one design
option. Would employees (as one stakeholder group) be able to generate
more design options, and what would characterise these choices?
An additional motivation was to get an impression of attitudes and thoughts
among employees, in order to understand the underlying current of discontent.
This led to the practical questions
– (PQ1) Did employees know what personal data were collected, and did they
care?
– (PQ2) Would they utilize an anonymization PET if it was available?
2.3 Method
A survey was created consisting of the following questions, all of which except
(4) were open questions with free-form text answers (see Fig. 1 for an example):
– (Q1) Which data do you think are collected and stored by the card readers
on the coffee machines?
– (Q2) Do you think the purpose of barring unauthorized coffee-getting could
also be attained with other data, or other means? Please explain briefly.
– (Q3) If there was a button “anonymised version of coffee-getting authentica-
tion” on the card reader, would you use it? Feel free to make any assumptions
about the system and its technology, as long as you briefly explain these as-
sumptions.2
– (Q4) Do you think your use of the coffee machines (including your use of
the fictitious button of question 3) may influence how your colleagues use
them? (choice between “no”, “maybe”, “yes”)
2 The button was a fictitious PET, initially thought of as a version of distributed and
possibly collaborative anonymisation [20], but open to interpretation by respondents.
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the first survey question.
– (Q5) If you checked “maybe” or “yes” in the previous question, please ex-
plain why. Feel free to make any assumptions about the system and its
technology, as long as you briefly explain these assumptions.
– (comments) Would you like to make any other comments?
The survey was available (a) online at www.surveymonkey.com and (b) as an
RTF file that could be printed out and forwarded to me anonymously. The invi-
tation to participate in the survey was sent out on 30th November, containing
the link and the file, via the email alias that reaches all 239 people working in
the department (i.e. all the people who may and now, via their personnel cards,
can use the coffee machines). The survey was described as part of a research
project. Answers were collected anonymously. To reduce the chance of people
participating multiple times, the survey used the surveymonkey option that re-
stricts answers to one per device. No further measures against multiple answers
were taken; however, given everybodys time constraints it appeared unlikely that
people would take part in a survey multiple times.
2.4 Results and discussion (1)
The survey was answered by 101 people, a response rate of 42%, within 2 days,
with 1 paper and 100 online versions. One empty online result was not counted.3
The free-form answers were analyzed with a simple form of thematic-analysis
coding [3].
The large majority of answers were thoughtful and respectful, and respon-
dents also expressed, in the comments question, much positive feedback about
the fact of the study and interest in the results. Some answers were short and/or
expressed humour and irony, such as “I’d like to suggest a James Bond-style iris-
scan for coffee privileges. It would be way cooler and in that way I don’t have
3 It is possible, but irrelevant for the results, that this person had first flipped through
the online version, was blocked from re-taking it, and therefore filled in the paper
version.
to worry about forgetting my card.” or “I am in a coffee drinking competition
with a colleague. We want authenticated personal stats!”
The questions were asked in an order designed to constrain answers as little
as possible, by asking a question q dealing with only one out of several possible
to another question p, only after p. Q1 asked about what knowledge (or beliefs)
people had about the new technology that had been deployed. Q2 asked about
possible alternative technologies (or: design ideas). This question had to add a
purpose (relative to Q1), without which the design question would have been
meaningless, and it made a minimal assumption based on the official communi-
cation that had been made. Q3 could only be asked afterwards, since it asked
about a specific instance of such technologies (anonymisation). Q4 was designed
to explore an aspect that is characteristic of privacy and some PETs (including
anonymisation PETs): social effects. With reference to PETs, it represented a
further specialisation of Q3, and therefore had to be asked after it. Q5 was the
request to elaborate on the multiple-choice answer to Q4.
Fig. 2. Variables arising from the questions (Q1–Q5) and from the exploratory analysis
(A, S), and their relationship to larger concepts. Lines between variables indicate the
existence of dependencies.
For the purposes of discussing the results, a different order is more mean-
ingful. Figure 2 shows a conceptual rendering of the decision aspects dealt with
in the different questions. The analysis will cover variables describing individ-
ual knowledge/beliefs and intentions about technology and PETs, then vari-
ables that describe social knowledge/beliefs (and their intersection with privacy-
related ones), and then design variables. A and S are variables defined in an
exploratory phase of analysis (see Section 2.5).
Due to the open nature of the survey and the exploratory aspects of analysis,
all data were analysed by descriptive statistics only. Inferential statistics are left
for follow-up studies.
Q1. More than three quarters of respondents (rightly) believe that tracking
takes place, but most do not know what is being tracked. 22.8% stated that
no data were collected and stored. Only 26.7% gave the correct or near-correct
answer that some user ID and the timestamp were being collected and stored.
(Technically, only the card ID is logged, but of course this can be linked, via
another database, to the user ID; therefore, these two answers were aggregated.)
another 26.7% thought that also the type of drink was being logged. 9.9% consid-
ered that aggregate consumption only, maybe with something else, was recorded
and stored, and 3% suspected some other form of data.
Answers including the type of drink would be correct if the respondent un-
derstood the question differently: “which data are collected and stored through a
card swipe”, because the coffee machine does record the type of consumed drink,
even if neither the card reader nor the authentication server logs have access to
this kind of information.
The distribution of answers may indicate that the question, while correctly
targeting data-protection concerns, was not optimally phrased, since technically
there are three different devices that collect data (coffee machine, card reader,
authentication server), and all three have different methods and durations of
storing the collected data. In addition, from a data-protection viewpoint, yet
another question is crucial: whether the data are collected and/or stored and/or
analysed. One respondent noted the logical underspecification in the information
that had been communicated: “The promise that there are no plans to collect
statistics does not say there will not be plans in the future, and statistics are
not logging so one can later still create statistics of the past.” Regardless of
these different possible misinterpretations, it is worthwhile noting that nearly a
quarter of employees, against their presumably existing understanding of how a
personnel-card reader works, (wrongly) interpreted the “promise of no statistics”
as “no data collection”.
Q3 was answered in the affirmative by 36.6% of respondents, and in the negative
by 35.6%. 12.9% mentioned usability (“one more button to press”) as a factor,
with 9 of these 13 people regarding the extra effort as a deterrent. (4 would still
use it.) 10.9% mentioned trust (“how would I be able to check?”, “although I
would not trust it”), although 8 of these 11 people would still use it.
Q1–Q3. There was a clear connection between the beliefs about data collection
and intentions to use the proposed PET (see Fig. 3). Obviously, for someone
who believes that no data are being collected, it would make no sense to invest
extra effort to anonymise, and thus the majority of these respondents (69.5%)
would not use the button. (The four people who believed no data collection to
take place in Q1 but wanting to use an anonymisation button in Q3 may have
changed their beliefs along the survey). 43% of those who believe some kind of
user ID is collected (whether with or without timestamp and with or without
other information) intended to use the anonymisation button, and only 27.7%
did not intend to use it. Most of the remaining 29% skipped the question.
Fig. 3. Q1–Q3: knowledge/beliefs about data collection and intention to use the ficti-
tious PET (numbers of respondents, percentages within the knowledge/belief group).
Q4 showed that nearly half of respondents (48.5%) believe that their use of the
coffee machines has (“yes”: 22.8%) or may have (“maybe”: 25.7%) effects on
other people. 34.7% explicitly believe that it does not have such effects (“no”).
The remainder did not answer this question. The answers to question (5) showed
that people had interpreted this question, as intended, with reference to coffee
getting and data protection. Asked about the reasons why in question (5), only
1 person referred to k-anonymity (which had been the motivation for this ques-
tion). 2 persons referred to effects of surveillance or chilling effects. Many more
talked more explicitly about social influence and peer pressure, with 7 refer-
ring to influence via imparting knowledge (awareness or reflection) and 9 via
imitation.
Q1–Q4. Both Q1 and Q4 ask about knowledge or beliefs, one about a technology
(not a PET), the other about privacy and behaviour in general and specific PETs
in particular. One may therefore expect that the answer distributions should be
independent of one another. On the other hand, it could be the case that people
who are more knowledgeable or reflective about privacy in general might also be
the ones for whom it is more salient that a particular technology will collect data.
There is (weak) support for the latter hypothesis: A majority (50.7%) of those
who believe some form of user ID is collected, also think that their behaviour
influences others, whereas this percentage is only 43.4% among the “no data are
collected” respondents.
Q2. Respondents proposed many different design alternatives. Since some peo-
ple offered various alternatives and others offered none, the following percentages
do not add up to 100%. The most frequent answers were two: there is no, or no
efficient, alternative (18.8%), and social control (24.8%). These can be consid-
ered, in the light of data collection, as two ends of the spectrum: “the problem
of unauthorised coffee-getting exists (and the current amount of data needs to
be collected)” and “the problem does not exist or is negligible (and the previous
approach in which no data are collected, is sufficient)”. 15.8% explicitly said that
they did not believe the problem exists.
Other answers acknowledge that the problem exists, but take different ap-
proaches with respect to data collection:
– without data: lock the room (4.9%), warning sign (4%), security guard
(5%), no plastic cups and no cups in the cafeteria (1%)
– without personal data (collection and/or storage): anonymous tokens
(10.9%), typing a code (6.9%), only checking authorization (5%)
– with less, or less fine-grained, personal data: restrict access to the
cafeteria with card readers, at all hours (12.8%), or restrict access to the
coffee machines with card readers, but only outside office hours (8.9%).
Three people mentioned cameras and facial recognition, i.e. more personal data,
and two others suggested an interesting variant: deactivated card readers or cam-
eras. Three answers suggested that people wanted to reap advantages of data
collection (personalization of the drinks).
In sum, these answers suggest that co-design with the affected employees
could work, and work efficiently (50% of respondents came up with their design
ideas in less than 6.5min, and 79% in less than 15min). Of course, some of these
options may in fact have been considered, and the relative costs are not known,
but the abundance of answers belies the simple acceptance by those 18.8% who
considered the chosen option to be without an alternative.
Q1–Q2. There was also evidence that the beliefs about data collection were
associated with the activity level and type of co-design. Figure 4 shows the dis-
tribution of the design groups over the “no data collected” resp. “some form of
user ID collected” respondents. Not only are data-collecting technologies that
collect fewer or no personal data more popular among the latter; they also pro-
pose reliance on social control (as a specific form of “no data” design) very often.
Conversely, most of the “no data collected” belief group sees no alternative to
the current technology.
Fig. 4. Q1–Q2: knowledge/beliefs about data collection and proposals for design (num-
bers of respondents).
With regard to the research and practical questions, the following results
were obtained:
– (PQ1) Most employees knew they were being tracked, but there were many
misconceptions about details, and around a third believed there was no data
collection/analysis.
– (PQ2) and (RQ1) Only slightly more than a third would use the fictitious
PET, an equal number would not use it, and the rest did not answer. Knowl-
edge/beliefs about data collection were clearly associated with intention to
use.
– (RQ2) Nearly half of users believe there are social effects.
– (RQ3) Users came up with many alternative proposals in a short time, with
people who had correct knowledge/beliefs about tracking generating more
and more privacy-friendly variants.
2.5 Results and discussion (2): Exploratory analysis
When coding the free-form answers to Q2, Q3 and Q5, further recurring themes
were identified.
A. Some respondents explicitly described their privacy attitudes, both positively
(e.g., “a severe privacy infringement”) and negatively (e.g., “I don’t feel protec-
tive of this data in the slightest”). Privacy attitudes could also be inferred from
many answers to the five questions, but attitudes per se were not inquired about,
so only explicit mentions were coded for this new variable. The resulting variable
A can therefore be regarded as a lower bound on the numbers of respondents
with positive pro-privacy or negative non-privacy-concerned attitudes.
A–Q3. As could be expected, respondents who expressed pro-privacy attitudes
also said they would use the fictitious PET (14 yes, 2 no), while respondents
who expressed that they did not care about protecting these data showed the
reverse pattern (4 yes, 12 no).
S. There were usability comments, both about the fictitious additional PET
(see results of Q3 above) and about the existing technology (the card readers).
Some remarks were made about accountability, via references to charging for
coffee consumption. Most of these were negative, but some were neutral (coded
as positive below).
In addition, respondents talked widely about effects that had not been ex-
pected in this research. First, these were altered perceptions of the communal
space. This occurred both as a description of why the new technology was re-
jected (e.g., “The department always have felt like a place where everybody
tries to be as flexible as possible [...] It’s sad that the department now seems
to be willing to question this flexibility over the price of a few coffees.”), and
as a design alternative (e.g. “provid[e] minimal free service to [other members
of the organisaton], be kind and open to non personnel, ...”). Other comments
described altered actions in the communal space (e.g., “Yes, [there will be social
effects: employees] will buy own coffee machine for the office. This will reduce the
number of informal meetings in cafeteria”). The events also led to an increased
salience of how decisions are made and communicated, with most comments
claiming that there had been no or poor communication of the purpose of the
new technology, and no evidence given of non-authorised coffee-getting.4
All S mentions identified concerns, i.e. that respondents cared about these
values. Thus, for S (sub-)variables, “positive” means the expression of a disutility
4 In reaction to this, decision makers said that observed cases had in fact been com-
municated, and asked whether it was their task to prove abuse – which indeed would
be impossible without another form of surveillance technology.
with respect to this criterion (e.g. for accountability: being charged for something
that was previously free), whereas “negative” means the expression of a neutral
or positive thought (e.g. that people would recognise the value of coffee).
The numbers of these comments are summarised in Table 1.
A usability account- altered altered saliency of S
(present (fictitious ability perception actions decision-
technology) PET) making total
positive 17 11 13 5 11 13 8 32
negative 18 0 0 2 1 1 0 4
sum 35 11 13 7 12 14 8 33
Table 1. Number of respondents with comments on A (explicitly expressed privacy
attitudes) and on any of the other “social” criteria, summarised as S. Some totals of S
are smaller than the column sum or row sum due to multiple criteria expressed by the
same persons.
A–S. In total, 55 respondents (55.4%) made comments about A, S, or both.
Of these, about 1/3 each (22 and 20) talked about only A or only S, and 13
about both. A further analysis of polarity indicated a substitution relationship
between “privacy” and “social” rationales: Of those who had not commented on
A, 30% commented on S. This proportion sank to 17.6% among those who had
commented on A positively (i.e. expressed that privacy was important to them),
but it rose to 55.6% among those who had commented on A negatively (i.e.
expressed that privacy was not important to them). One respondent expressed
this explicitly: “Anonymity is not the point here”, then explaining their concern
about S topics.
3 Consequences for risk/privacy-utility models in DPbD
The high response rate of the survey in general, and the free-form answers in
particular, indicated that many employees perceived significant risks and disu-
tility through the introduction of the card-reader access control. This has to be
considered in relation to the utility gained.
A standard approach to this decision situation follows [11] and models
– utility is the utility of data usage.
– risk is the disclosure risk (or, more generally, privacy risk) to those whose
personal data are being collected.
It is generally assumed that the processing of a full data set has the most utility,
but also the most risk, the processing of no data has no utility and no risk,
and fewer or transformed (e.g. k-anonymised) data have intermediate levels of
both. This produces the tradeoff “the more utility, the more risk”. This is shown,
schematically, by curve 1 in Fig. 5.
There is an alternative form of modelling, often used to describe and compare
forms of privacy-preserving data mining/publishing. Here, the second component
is a measure of (data) privacy, the inverse of risk, and the tradeoff is “the more
privacy, the less utility” [2].
Fig. 5. Three schematic curves in risk-utility space. N = no personal data (with grey
background: situation before start of data collection), F = full data, T = transformed
data (e.g. k-anonymised).
The existence of this claimed tradeoff is, in a sense, tautological: If an un-
constrained optimisation (e.g. the accuracy of a classifier learned from a full
dataset) is the definition of the “full” utility, then any constrained optimisation
(e.g. caused by some data privacy measure threshold) must be smaller or equal,
and is usually smaller than, the unconstrained optimum. The amount that has
to be traded off, and the shape of the tradeoff curve, may however depend on
the data transformation processes applied.
Utility and privacy risk in the case study: a first model Going back to
the case study: What exactly are utility and risk?
The utility in the original tradeoff curves is “data utility”: “the value of
a given data release as an analytical resource – the key issue being whether
the data represent whatever it is they are supposed to represent” [12, p. 135].
However, this notion accords a conceptual independence to the data and their
function that they do not have in real-world contexts and applications.
From the perspective of contexts and applications, utility is linked to the
purpose of data collection. This is linked to different factors. If a given factor is
part of the purpose, then a technology that achieves this goal will create utility.
If it is not part of the purpose, it will not create utility. Here:
– authentication only personnel members should be able to use the resource.
– accountability1 of coffee consumers for their consumption.
– accountability2 of the coffee supplier for invoiced amounts.
– accountability3 of individuals or specified anonymity sets in cases of abuse,
as when a theft has occurred and the persons in the room at the time are to
be determined.5
The privacy risks are mainly the potential to create motion profiles, make
inferences from them, and take action based on these inferences (see Section 2.1).
3.1 Risk-utility tradeoffs, DPbD, and data minimisation
What would it mean to apply DPbD in the present use case, or in extensions
of this? On the one hand, a number of concerns that could be termed “classical
PET concerns” would need to be taken into account: the security and encryp-
tion technology used for cards, for data transfer, and log storage, access control
for the logs, separation of the logs from the mapping of pseudonyms to IDs,
etc. However, as Schaar [19] has pointed out in a critique of a classical case
of the failure of an ambitious PbD project, a focus on these technology-centric
considerations may lead decision makers to neglect important data protection
principles, in particular data minimisation.
Data minimisation depends on the purpose of data collection. In a nutshell,
it asks whether a given purpose can also be achieved with less data. This ques-
tion presupposes that data processing yields a certain utility (= by fulfilling
the purpose) and generates certain risks. Therefore, I propose to regard data
minimisation as casting DPbD as a question of design in a risk-utility space.
For illustration, some simple approaches will be discussed that depart from
the current infrastructure and thus would impose only negligible extra costs.
The costs of card and authentication-server infrastructure are sunk costs; and
the deployment of different hardware was not considered an alternative and is
therefore not considered further here. To measure the extent of the risks, a simple
variant of k-anonymity is used. (Different measures, e.g. based on differential
privacy, or taking into account the accuracy of inferences, are possible but would
require more assumptions.)
Assume the purpose is only to prevent unauthorised use of the resource and
accountability2. An anonymisation of the logs whereby each user pseudonym
is replaced by the constant “authorised user” or “unauthorised user” would
suffice to serve this purpose with no personal data, thus leaving utility unaffected
and reducing privacy risk to their starting level. (For the sake of simplicity of
5 In the case study, the latter two were mentioned by administrative/management
personnel involved in card-reader deployment, in a follow-up interview of the survey.
the argument, threats from stronger – and more costly – attacks involving for
example physical observation and record linkage, are ignored.)6
If the purpose is also accountability1, a follow-up question needs to ask
whether in fact individuals are to be charged for their consumptions, or ad-
ministrative units. In the latter case, a k-anonymisation of the logs whereby
each authorised user’s pseudonym is replaced by their respective unit ID would
suffice to serve this purpose. Again, utility would remain unaffected, and privacy
risk would be reduced to the level of k, with k the size of the smallest unit.
The distinction between individual and collective accountability [4] becomes
more acute if accountability3 is also a purpose. Various questions should be
asked: Should and could this accountability be individual or collective (for ex-
ample, it is conceivable that whole units take responsibility and are held liable in
cases of theft)? Should such accountability be multi-step, i.e. the unit takes re-
sponsibility to the outside and imposes individual sanctions on the inside? Who
should decide on this question?
For all forms of accountability, data are likely to be needed only for certain
periods. Beyond that, they can (and therefore should) be deleted, an operation
that will not affect utility but reduce privacy risks.
Best-case risk-utility values resulting from this thought experiment are shown,
in schematic form, by curve 2 in Fig. 5, which indicates that there is no or a
negligible tradeoff (negligible if the costs of data transformation are taken into
account, no if they aren’t).
3.2 Extending risk-utility tradeoff models by multicriteria
decision-making modelling
However, as the exploratory analysis has shown, there is a third component
here summarised as S. In the present study, the following additional factors of
(dis)utility were found (cf. Section 2.5):
– usability
– altered perception of a communal space
– altered actions in the communal space
– increased salience of how decisions are made and communicated.
This can be modelled as an additional risk factor or an additional disutility fac-
tor. All else equal, this would shift curves upward (more risk) or to the left (less
utility). Curve 3 in Fig. 5 uses the latter approach in order to not change the
semantics of the risk.7 It shows that in extreme cases, even with perfect PETs
6 This constraint on utility also illustrates the dependence of technical solutions’ utility
on purposes. The proposal “no plastic cups and no cups in the cafeteria” to Q2 would
serve the purpose of barring non-authorised use, but not that of accountability2.
However, the existence of this purpose was likely unknown to respondents.
7 The semantics of the risk that are generally used in risk-utility models focus on an
individuum-centric notion of privacy. The current focus on the risks of tracking using
personal data (see Section 3) follows this approach. Certainly privacy is not only an
and data minimisation, the outcome could be worse than the starting point:
Assume that authentication is data-minimal and secure, and no personal data
are stored. As a result, utility with respect to the goals of authentication and
accountability may increase, as explained in the previous section. However, this
increase may be more than offset by a decrease in utility caused by losses in
usability and perceptions of and actions in the communcal space. The increased
salience of decision making may be considered positive for utility (to the extent
that employee awareness and participation are desired) or as negative for util-
ity (to the extent that such awareness is considered to lead to discontent for
employees and/or work for management). These utilities and disutilities may
be experienced by different stakeholders, but they can be aggregated into an
organisation-wide utility measure. In sum, any choice along curve 3, which con-
tains the available options with the new technology, would be inferior to the
starting point, i.e. create less utility and the same or higher risk.
To avoid such inferior choices, DPbD should draw more strongly on multicri-
teria decision making: Data protection and privacy risks need to be measured but
should be weighed against a notion of utility composed of the classical purpose-
dependent utility and disutilities caused by usability and social implications.
4 Limitations and lessons learned
There were only two clearly negative comments on the survey, and these serve
well as introductions to this section.
One respondent found the questions “silly, not precise enough, and highly
biased”.
I believe that silliness is a matter of perspective and will therefore disregard
this. As explained above, the questions were on purpose underspecified and left
much room for open, including unexpected, answers. It is true, however, that this
openness also in some cases led to answers that were more difficult to interpret.
So while openness allowed for exploration and the discovery of the variables A
and S, and thereby led to the design ideas described in Section 3.2, the results
should be validated in follow-up work in a confirmatory manner.
There was indeed some imprecision in phrasing, in particular with respect
to Q1. This issue has been described in Section 2.3, and as argued there, this
imprecision also had some unexpected advantages. Still, in follow-up work a com-
promise should be found between technical exactness and linguistic simplicity
when describing technological functionality.
In this study, there were two main expressions or sources of bias.
The first relates to Q2. It implied that the card readers have the purpose
of barring unauthorised coffee-getting. In fact, this was an interpretation of the
individual but also a collective value, so some aspects of “altered perceptions of a
communal space” could be modelled as an additional factor of privacy risk. However,
it appears questionable to subsume also usability or the salience of decision making
under “privacy risks”.
communication to employees, which had not talked about purpose(s), but high-
lighted the benefit to the department of not having to pay for outsiders’ coffee
consumption (which had never been authorised, but previously could not be
avoided). This interpretation led to the notion of “unauthorised coffee-getting”
in Q2.
The phrasing of question (2) may suggest that this be the sole purpose. This
was not the case (even if other purposes had not been communicated). While
the phrasing of Q2 was legitimate in the context of Q2 (whose purpose was
indeed to obtain design alternatives for this purpose), the phrasing may have
influenced the answers to the questions following it. In follow-up work, the order
of questions should be considered very carefully, and questions that may prime
certain concepts may be placed later.
The second source of bias was made apparent by the results themselves, in
particular in the exploratory analysis. The research and survey questions were
formulated on a background of a long personal history of privacy research, and
this may have led to a certain de´formation professionelle. As Gu¨rses and Diaz
[14] observe, one always needs to ask who formulated the privacy problem: the
“experts” or the “users”. As they point out, privacy/security experts tend to
perceive problems of institutional privacy, usually the collection and processing
of data by powerful corporations or governments, whereas users tend to focus
more on social privacy, the question of who among their peers should know what.
In [9], we have proposed this question of “who defines the privacy problem”
as one of five key self-reflective questions that privacy researchers should ask
themselves to improve the quality and transparency of their work. The results
of the present study suggest that part of the bias of the “expert” is, already
prior to questions such as institutional or social privacy, to cast every problem
as a privacy problem. While the present users’ concerns about S topics often
revolved around social consequences of technology, these were not limited, or
even expressly not about, social privacy. When they were about privacy, they
revolved around institutional privacy. Viewed over all users, there seemed to be
a substitution effect of institutional privacy concerns versus social non-privacy
concerns. Thus, the present study suggests an additional self-reflective question:
“who defines the problem, and is it really (only) a privacy problem?”.
The second critical remark from respondents was that “[t]his survey looks
much like unnecessary criticism on the department’s decision to install these card
readers.” As remarks from other respondents, referred to above as increased
saliency of decision-making, show, many respondents voiced criticism of this
decision. However, in the light of the De Hert and Gutwirth [8] analysis of data
protection as a transparency tool towards the powerful (data controllers and
processors)8, it needs to be asked when such criticism is “unnecessary” and when
it is not. Other respondents regarded the very existence of criticism as positive:
“The critical reception of the card readers on our coffee machines is actually
a good sign. One can’t expect (junior) scientists to be good and uncritical at
8 complemented by privacy protection as an opacity tool towards the powerless (data
subjects)
the same time.” The survey itself led to some concrete measures for improving
the transparency of decision making (so far, a voluntary self-commitment of the
employee representative to communicate results of decision making more widely).
5 Summary, general conclusions, and future work
The results of the case study validate models of complex individual decision-
making in privacy-related questions, in particular the importance of social in-
fluences posited by the ASPECT/ARCADE model of [17]. They also validate
the necessity of a number of prerequisites for people to use PETs, in particu-
lar knowledge, beliefs and attitudes, in addition to or even before usability can
improve technology acceptance, as posited in the step model of [18].
The opinion, widespread among respondents, that privacy operates also via
social effects can be interpreted, with some caution, as an understanding that
“my privacy utility influences yours, and vice versa”, thus presenting some em-
pirical support for PETs that are built on co-utility [10]. However, concrete
instances such as collaborative distributed anonymisation [20] require more ded-
icated user-based evaluations. In a first user study [16], we found that while
non-technical users in general understood the concept of k-anonymity and the
notion of privacy that it can provide for them, it was less clear to them that
to obtain such k-anonymity, they need to contribute to it. Thus, the study did
not provide evidence that these users understood or appreciated the notion of
co-utility applicable in the example application and architecture. That study,
however, suffered from an example domain in which participants did not have
strong privacy preferences. Follow-up work will aim at designing a more con-
vincing task, taking into account also the results of the present study.
Beyond supporting earlier research, the present results however call into ques-
tion the models from computer science / data mining that posit a privacy-utility
tradeoff, where utility is measured in a simplistic way that centers on the ac-
curacy of the personal data and (if applicable) the models learned from these
data. The results illustrate how social considerations, and considerations about
– both their own and organisations’ – decision-making and its transparency, are
woven into people’s reactions to technology. The perceived negative effects on
social spaces can even outweigh perceived threats based on data processing and
possible privacy violations. Therefore , multicriteria notions of utility are needed,
and this leads to design spaces in which less privacy can be associated with less
utility rather than be compensated for by more utility, as the standard tradeoff
models suggest. From a legal standpoint, a multicriteria notion of utility already
ties in well with the GDPRs stated goal that data protection be the protection
of a wide range of individuals rights and freedoms, not only the rights to data
protection and privacy. From a computational standpoint, however, more efforts
are needed to embed multicriteria utility into DPbD.
In future work, we aim to use the insights gained for different phases of
DPbD, in particular Impact Assessments and design itself. This includes creat-
ing practical guidelines for including these considerations into (a then extended)
Impact Assessment, and testing these guidelines for understandability and ef-
fectiveness. As a first step, this can build on the PIA Guidelines we developed
for teaching and training contexts [21]. In addition, organisational card-reader
deployment will be studied in a more general, recently started project involving
the present author and others.
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